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Human Rights and the European Union:
Who Decides? Possible Conflicts
Between the European Court of Justice
and the European Court of Human
Rights
Elizabeth F. Defeis*
I.

Introduction

The Treaty of Amsterdam, which came into force in 1999,
affects both the substantive content of human rights and the
mechanisms available to protect human rights in the European
Union. The human rights policy of the European Union is twofold. It affects all community actions and national action and
legislation that implement community law. It also affects the
external relations of the European Union by addressing human
rights concerns in its dealings with nations who are not members of
the European Union.'

* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. Professor Defeis
would like to thank her research assistant Peter P. Sepulveda, Class of 2002.
1. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the
Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, 1997
O.J. (C 340) [hereinafter Amsterdam Treaty], incorporated into the TREATY
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7,1992, O.J. (C 224)
1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992).
The Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 49:
Any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1)
may apply to become a member of the Union. It shall address its
application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting
the Commission and after receiving the assent of the European
Parliament, which shall act by an absolute majority of its component
members.
See Barbara Brandtner & Allan Rosas, Human Rights and the External
Relations of the European Community: An Analysis of Doctrine and Practice,
available at http://www.EJIL.org/JournalVol9/No3/Art2.html
(last modified
November 9, 1999).
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The protection of human rights as a fundamental principal of
the European Union, although a relatively recent phenomenon, is
one that is now firmly entrenched in European Union policy and
law. The main focus of the Treaty of Rome of 1957, [hereinafter
EEC Treaty] which established the European Union, was economic
integration, albeit with political overtones. Since it was necessary
to harmonize the work force throughout the community the treaty
addressed workers' rights including the right to equal pay based on
gender.! Subsequent treaties, primarily designed to strengthen a
single internal market and foster monetary integration, acknowledged the goal of promoting democracy on the basis of fundamental rights.3 Although the European Court of Justice early
recognized human rights as a fundamental aspect of community
law, its approach to human rights, while rigorous as compared to
other European Union institutions was ad hoc and lacked a
coherent policy. For example, although it ruled that the content of
human rights protections derived from the constitutional traditions
of member states4 and later to international agreements to which
states are party,5 it did not initially apply the provisions of the
European Convention on Human Rights to cases before it nor did
it refer to the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in
its opinions. Although more recently, it has referred to decisions of
the European Court of Human Rights, it has also ruled that without
an amendment to the EEC Treaty, the EU could not itself become
a party to the European Convention on Human Rights.'
In 1999, the Treaty of Amsterdam came into force and
explicitly incorporated the human rights standards set out in the
European Convention on Human Rights into European Union law.
Article 6(2) provides that "the Union shall respect fundamental
rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms." Further
2. Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, (1957).
3. Single European Act, February 17, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, 2, [1987]
C.M.L.R. 741. Preamble states: "Determined to work together to promote
democracy on the basis of the fundamental rights recognized in the constitutions
and laws of the Member States, in the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European Social Charter, notably
freedom, equality and social justice."
4. Case 29/69, Stauder v. Ulm Sozialamt, 1969 E.C.R. 419, at 427 [1970] 10
C.M.L.R. 112 (1970).
5. Case 4/73, Nold, Kohlen-und BaustoffsgroBhandlund v. Commission, 1974

E.C.R. 491, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 338 (1974).
6. Case 2/94, Re: the Accession of the Community to the European Human
Rights Convention, 2 C.M.L.R. 265 (1996). See Grant v. South-West Trains, (C
249/96) [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 993.
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the European Court of Justice is now required, whenever it has
jurisdiction, to apply these human rights standards in relation to
acts of the European Union institutions and to actions of members
The Treaty of
states implementing European Union Law.
Amsterdam has also expanded the jurisdiction of the European
Court of Justice and the potential for overlapping subject matter
jurisdiction with the European Court of Human Rights, the court
that has jurisdiction over claimed violations of the European
Convention on Human Rights has thus been increased. This
presents the potential for possible conflicts between the decisions
given by the European Court of Justice and the European Court of
Human Rights on human rights issues that will be decided.
This article will explore the development of the human rights
jurisprudence of the European Union and note the conflicts that
might occur due to overlapping jurisdiction of the European Court
of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. It will then
explore the options that might be explored to create a harmonious
and integrated approach to human rights in the European Union.
II.

History

Incorporating human rights as a fundamental principle of
European Union law has been achieved through a series of
amendments to European Union treaties, through Council and
Commission action and through decisions of the European Court of
More recently the European Parliament, the only
Justice.
democratically elected institution has taken a leadership role with
respect to articulating human rights concerns in the European
Union.8
7. Art. 46(d), Treaty of Amsterdam:
The provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and the
Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community concerning
the powers of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the
exercise of those powers shall only apply to the following provisions of
this Treaty:
(d) Article 6(2) with regard to action of the institutions, insofar as
the Court has jurisdiction under the Treaties establishing the
European Communities and under this Treaty.
Article 6(2): The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on
November 4, 1950 and as they result from the Constitutional
traditions common to the Member States, as general principles
of Community Law.
8. Resolution of the Commission adopting the declaration of fundamental
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When the European Union [hereinafter EU] was first
established in 1957, its primary goal was the attainment of
economic integration.9 Although the Treaty of Rome does contain
a Social Chapter which gives limited mention to human rights and
the protection of workers' rights, its primary focus is to improve
working conditions on a harmonized basis throughout the
Community.1" Specific individual rights that the EEC Treaty
protects include the freedom of movement and freedom from
discrimination on the basis on nationality and gender.1 Beyond the
mention of these principles, however, the EEC offers little to no
protection in other areas of human rights nor does it contain any
specific provisions to enforce these rights. 2
While the Single European Act [hereinafter SEA] of 1987, like
the Treaty of Rome, deals primarily with the completion of a single
internal market, the SEA exemplifies a stronger concern for
fundamental rights. 3

The SEA Preamble declares that all the

Member States are "determined to work together to promote
democracy on the basis of the fundamental rights recognized in the
constitutions and laws of the Member States, in the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and
the European Social Charter, notably freedom, equality, and social
justice."14
The Treaty on the European Union (TEU), adopted in 1992, is
a further step in integrating human rights concerns in EU law,
policy and regulation. It converts this concern for human rights
into an obligation of the Union to "respect freedoms, fundamental
rights and freedoms of Apr. 12, 1989, 1989 O.J. C/120; Joint Declaration by the
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of 5 April 1977, 1977 O.J.
C/103 27.4; 1996 O.J. (L 185) 24.7, at 5 (July 15, 1996) (Council, acting under Art.
K3 of the TEU, adopted laws to fight racism and xenophobia). Parliament has
repeatedly adopted resolutions on respect for human rights in the European
Union. These have included calls for the EU to accede to the EHRC and for
abolition of the death penalty in Member States that had not yet done so. See
Alston and Weiler, infra note 23.
9. Elizabeth F. Defeis, The Treaty of Amsterdam: The Next Step Towards
Gender Equality?, 23 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 2, (1999).
10. EEC Art. 3 (ex Art. C)-Title III Social Policy. Moreover, its provisions
were aspirational and called upon member states to promote improved working
conditions and an improved standard of living.
11. Article 39 (ex Art. 48) provided that freedom of movement shall be
secured within the Community. Article 141 (ex Art. 119) provided "each Member
State shall ensure that the principle of equal pay for male and female workers for
equal work or work of equal value is applied."
12. Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1957).
13. Single European Act, July 1987, 2 C.M.L.R. 741 (1987).
14. Single European Act, July 1987, 2 C.M.L.R. 741 (1987) at Preamble.
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human rights, in accordance with the protections afforded by the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, as those that arise from the constitutional
traditions common to the Member States as general principles of
Community law."15 However, this treaty did not address the
jurisdiction of the ECJ. At the same time, however, the European
Court Justice was continuing to develop a firm jurisprudential
underpinning for its position that respect for fundamental rights is
one of the general principles of European Community law and must
be applied by the court. 6 Additionally, although some member
states wanted the European Union itself to adhere to the European
Convention on Human Rights others disagreed because of the
possible conflict of jurisdictions between the ECJ and the European
Court of Human Rights [hereinafter ECHR] in Strasbourg 7
III. Treaty of Amsterdam
By amending much of the TEU as well as the other previous
treaties, the Amsterdam Treaty adopted in 1999 now formally
incorporates fundamental human rights into the institutions of the
European Union. In addition, it affirms the European Union's
commitment to fundamental social rights as defined in the
European Social Charter, signed at Turin on October 18, 1961, and
in the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights
of Workers. 8 The Amsterdam Treaty introduces a number of
elements that play a key role in the European Union's development
of a coherent human rights policy. For the first time the treaty
provides that the European Union is specifically founded on the
principles of liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law
15. Treaty on the European Union, available at http://europa.eu.int/en
/record/mt/top.html (last visited July 5, 2001).
16. The White Paper on the Amsterdam Treaty, availableat http://booleweb
.ucc.ie/search/subject/offpub/ opcedc.htm at 4.5. (last modified October 1996).
17. Id. The European Court of Human Rights sits in Strasbourg, and
individuals, as well as Member States, may take complaints of human rights
violations directly before the court.
Jurisdiction over Member States is
compulsory. All Member States of the European Union and most potential
members, such as Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Macedonia have ratified the
Convention. The European Court of Human Rights is separate and apart from the
EC and the mechanisms of the European Union, such as the Commission,
Parliament, and the European Council. See Peter Leuprecht, Innovations in the
European System of Human Rights Protection: Is Enlargement Compatible with
Reinforcement? 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 313, 313-17 (1998). See also,
Tara C. Stever, Protecting Human Rights in the European Union, 20 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J., 919, at 999 (1997).
18. Treaty of Amsterdam, Preamble.
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and provides further that the "Union... shall respect fundamental
rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention [on Human
Rights] as they result from the Constitutional traditions common to
Member States as general principles of Community law." The ECJ
is now required, whenever it has jurisdiction, to apply human rights
standards as set out in the ECHR to the acts of Community
institutions.19 The concept of discrimination, originally introduced
in the Treaty of Rome, has been expanded and the Community's
institutions are now authorized to 'take appropriate action to
combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion
or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation." 2 The Equal Pay
provision now incorporates the comparable worth principle and
requires equal pay for work of equal value and specifically allows
affirmative action programs. 2 Additionally, in reforming the Third
Pillar's policies and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice has been expanded to
include matters relating to immigration, asylum, visas, border
crossings, and police and judicial criminal cooperation. Thus, it
seems clear that the case docket of the ECJ will increasingly include
human rights issues.2
The external human rights policy of the European Union has
been clarified and the treaty provides that all nations seeking to
accede to the Community must respect the principles of liberty,
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
and the rule of law while current Member States that violate these
fundamental principles face possible sanctions and suspension of
their rights.'
Although Parliament's position that a Charter of Fundamental
Social Rights should be integrated in the Treaty was not adopted in
19. Id. at Art. 6.2 (ex Art. F).
20. Id. at Art. 13 (ex Art. 6a).
21. The White Paper, supra note 16, at 11, 46. The requirement of equal pay
for work of comparable value, equal treatment and permissible limits of
affirmative action were originally contained in the Equal Treatment Directive of
1976. (76/207/EEC) European Communities Council Directive of 9 Feb. 1976.
22- See The Future of the Judicial System of the European Union. Cited in
Update memo to ECJ.
23. Treaty of Amsterdam Art. 7 (ex Art. F.1). See Philip Alston & J.H.H.
Weiler, An "Ever Closer Union" in Need of a Human Rights Policy, 9 E.J.I.L. 658,
at 672. Alston and Weiler continue by noting how "strange" it looks to have these
policies in the Treaty while, at the same time, an overall policy to promote human
rights within the Community still does not exist. They explain that there seems to
be the fear that "empowering the Community in the field of human rights would
be an invitation to a wholesale destruction of the jurisdictional boundaries
between the Community and its Member States."
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the Treaty of Amsterdam it appears likely that such a charter will

soon be presented for consideration. 4 However, Parliament's plea
for the EU to accede to the Council of Europe's social charter was
not." Nevertheless, the Amsterdam Treaty contains a number of
innovations that will enhance the role of Parliament in Human
Rights matters. They include the change from cooperation to co-

decision as the basis for decision-making in relation to a number of
important issues, such as discrimination on grounds of nationality,
the right of establishment for foreign nationals, equal opportunities
and equal treatment, consumer protection and data protection. 26 It
also requires consultation in relation to issues of discrimination on
all of the prohibited grounds, except for nationality and gives a role
to the Parliament in any procedure under Article 7 of the TEU 7 to
24. The concept of a catalogue of Bill of Rights for the European Union has been
debated for as long as 1997 and it now appears that a Charter of Fundamental Rights
for the European Union will soon be presented for consideration. See Louis Henkin,
New Birth of Constitutionalisn Genetic Influences and Genetic Defects, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM,

IDENTITY,

DIFFERENCE

AND LEGITIMACY:

THEORETICAL

PERSPECTIVES 3 (Michel Rosenfeld ed., 1994).

25.
26.
27.
1.

European Parliament Fact Sheet, supra note 68.
See generally, Treaty of Amsterdam.
Art. 7 (ex Art. F.1) states:
The Council, meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or
Government and acting by unanimity on a proposal by one third of
the Member States or by the Commission and after obtaining the
assent of the European Parliament, may determine the existence of a
serious and persistent breach by a Member State of principles
mentioned in Article 6(1), after inviting the government of the
Member State in question to submit its observations.
2. Where such a determination has been made, the Council, acting by a
qualified majority, may decide to suspend certain of the rights
deriving from the application of this Treaty to the Member State in
question, including the voting rights of the representative of the
government of that Member State in the Council. In doing so, the
Council shall take into account the possible consequences of such a
suspension on the rights and obligations of natural and legal persons.
The obligations of the Member State in question under this Treaty
shall in any case continue to be binding on that State.
3
The Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide subsequently
to vary or revoke measures taken under paragraph 2 in response to
changes in the situation which led to their being imposed.
4. For the purposes of this Article, the Council shall act without taking
into account the vote of the representative of the government of the
Member State in question. Abstentions by members present in
person or represented shall not prevent the adoption of decisions
referred to in paragraph 1. A qualified majority shall be defined as
the same proportion of the weighted votes of the members of the
Council concerned as laid down in Article 205(2) of the Treaty
establishing the European Community.
This paragraph shall also apply in the event of voting rights being
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suspend the rights of a Member State for a "serious and persistent
breach" of Human Rights.
IV. European Court of Justice and Human Rights
A. Introduction
While the treaties themselves are general and lack specificity
with regard to human rights, the Commission has issued numerous
directives and statements on human rights in areas such as gender
equality and privacy.' The newly invigorated Parliament has taken
the lead in requiring greater protection for human rights.
However, it is the European Court of Justice which until now has
taken the lead with respect to infusing human rights concerns into the
fabric of community law and indeed the treaty amendments reflecting
human rights concerns embody the principles already established in
the case law of the ECJ. 29 Early on the court recognized human rights
as part of Community law and developed principles protecting
fundamental rights by referring to the Constitutional traditions of
member states3° as well as the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedom and other international treaties.3'
However, although it has referred to the decisions of the European
Court of Human Rights the organ principally charged with
interpreting and enforcing the European Convention, the ECJ has yet
to rule that it is bound by the decisions of the European Court of
suspended pursuant to paragraph 2.
5.

For the purposes of this Article, the European Parliament shall act

by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, representing a majority of
its members.
28. Council Directive 75/117, 1975 O.J. (645) 19 (principle of equal pay);
Council Directive 76/207, 1976 O.J. (L 39) 40 (no discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy, maternity, or in working conditions); Council Directive 79/7, 1979 O.J.
(L 6) 24 (progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment in matters
of social security is permissible). In order to remove the obstacles to the free
movement of data while guaranteeing the protection of the right to privacy,

Directive 95/46/EC aims at harmonizing the national provisions in this field. The
right to privacy of citizens will therefore have equivalent protection across the
Union. The fifteen Member States of the EU are required to put their national
legislation in line with the provisions of the directive by October 24, 1998.
Furthermore, on July 12, 2000, the Commission authored a proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council "[oin a common

regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services."
29.

See Alston and Weiler, supra note 23, at 709.

30. Case 29/69, Stauder v. Ulm Sozialamt, 1969 E.C.R. 419, at 427, [1970] 10
C.M.L.R. 112 (1970).
31. Case 4/73, Nold, Kohlen-und BaustoffsgroBhandlund v. Commission, 1974
E.C.R. 491 13, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 338 (1974).
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Human Rights. Further, it has ruled that absent amendment to the
treaty, the European Union lacked the competence to accede to the
Convention thereby subjecting the institution to the jurisdiction of the
European Court of Human Rights.32 Finally, a 1998 ruling of the ECJ
cast into doubt the legal basis for much of the funding provided for
human rights and democracy related activities potentially as they
related to the external human rights policy of the Union.33
B. ECJ Decisions and Human Rights

A noted scholar of the European Union, Phillip Alston has
stated "the ECJ deserves immense credit for pioneering the
protection of fundamental human rights within the legal order of
the Community when the Treaties themselves were silent on this
matter.4 Indeed this observation is well founded.
As early as 1964, in Costa v ENEL, the ECJ established the
principle of supremacy of Community law over the domestic law of
member states in order to ensure application of Community law
throughout the community. " However, the supremacy doctrine
was met with resistance particularly in the area of human rights.
While the EEC treaty contained very limited human rights
provisions, the constitutions of the member states were for the most
part adopted subsequent to World War II and contained human
rights guarantees modeled on documents such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the United States Bill of Rights and
the French Declaration on the Rights of Man. 36

Thus, it was

unacceptable to some member states to implement community
legislation without scrutinizing it through the lens of their own
constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights.37 And indeed, the
German Constitutional Court in 1967 held that since the
Community legal order lacked specific protection of human rights,
the transfer of powers from the German legal system to the
Community had to be measured against domestic constitutional
provisions.38

32. Case 2/94, Re: the Accession of the Community to the European Human
Rights Convention, 2 C.M.L.R. 265 (1996).
33. Case 106/96, United Kingdom v. Commission, 1998 E.C.R. 1-2729, at 32.
34. See Alston and Weiler, supra note 23, at 709.
35. Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, at 4.
36. Louis HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY 32-33 (1978).
37. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, The Protection of Human Rights in the European
Union: Overview and Bibliography,22 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO., 228, 231 (1994).
38. Bundesverfassungsgerichtshof, order of Oct. 18, 1967, BverfGE, 1967, 223.
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In the face of this challenge to the supremacy of community
law, the ECJ attempted to clarify its position and give assurances to
member states in the area of fundamental rights. In the 1969 case
of Stauder v. Ulm39 the court noted that it was required by specific
treaty provisions to ensure that in the interpretation and
application of the Treaty, the law is observed.' This law, the court
made clear, includes the "fundamental rights of individuals
enshrined in the general principles of Community law and
protected by the court.",4' However, the court did not specify the
rights that were protected nor did it provide guidance with respect
to determining principles of Community law that require the
observance of such rights.42
One year later, the court explained that basic human rights
form part of the community law and is "inspired" by the
Constitutional tradition of the member states.43 In Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft,the court ruled that Community laws might be
annulled if they violate fundamental rights found in the
constitutions of Member States, as long as a guarantee of those
rights is contained in the objectives and structure of the Community
law.' In other words, the ECJ determined that its inspiration for
protecting human rights derives from the Member States'
constitutional traditions but that the Community still had the
obligation and authority to ensure those rights within the structure
and objectives of the Community. 45 However, some member states,
particularly Germany, were concerned that the European
Community had not developed a system for the protection of
human rights and continued to rely on domestic constitution
guarantee.
The court then further refined its definition of human rights.
In Nold v. Commission46 it declared that in addition to
constitutional provisions, rights found in international agreements

39. See Stauder, supra note 4, at 424.
40. Treaty of Amsterdam, Art. 220 (ex Art. 164). Article 220 provides: "[tihe
Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the
Treaty the law is observed."
41. See Stauder, supra note 4, at 424.
42. See Stauder, supra note 4, at 424.
43. See Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft GmbH v. Einfuhr-undVorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, at
2; [1972]
C.M.L.R. 255.
44. See id.
45. See Henckaerts, supra note 37, at 231-32.
46. See Case 4/73, Nold, Kohlen-und Baustoffsgro Bhandlung v. Commission
of the European Communities, 1974 E.C.R. 491.
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which the Member States had collaborated in or were a party to are
relevant in the court's analysis of fundamental rights.47 One year
later, this declaration was taken a step further in Rutili v. Minister
48
for the Interior,
where for the first time the European Convention
on Human Rights was referred to explicitly. 9 In evaluating a
member state's argument that restriction of an alien's movement
were justified on grounds of public policy, the court applied the
EEC provision and characterized the limitation permitted under
community law as specific manifestations of more general principles
enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.5° The court stated:
Taken as a whole, these limitations placed on the powers of
Member States in respect of control of aliens are a specific
manifestation of the more general principle, enshrined in
Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on
4 November 1950 and ratified by all the Member States, and in
Article 2 of the Protocol No 4 of the same Convention, signed in
Strasbourg on 16 September 1963, which provide, in identical
terms, that no restrictions in the interests of national security or
public safety shall be placed on the rights secured by the abovequoted Articles other than such as are necessary
51 for the
protection of those interests 'in a democratic society.
Thus, following Rutili, the Member States' public policy
derogation from Community law could be reviewed by the ECJ
under clear human rights standards articulated not only in
constitutional provisions of member states, but also under the
provisions of the ECHR.52
In Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, the court reaffirmed this
principle and reviewed a community measure that restricted the use
of property.53 The court examined the Community measure not
47. Id. at
48.

2.

Case 36/75, Roland Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975 E.C.R. 1219.

49. Henckaerts, supra note 37, at 233.
50.

E.g., under Article 48(1) of the treaty, Freedom of Movement for workers

is to be secured within the Community. However, Article 48(3) reserves to the

state the right to limit such movement if justified on grounds of public policy. The
court relied on Articles 8, 9, 10, and 11 of the ECHR and on Article 2 of the
Prologue to define the limits of the public policy exception.
51. Case 36/75, Rolan Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975 E.C.R. 1219, at
32 (1975).
52. Id.
53. Case 44/79, Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3727. In
Hauer, appellant was the owner of land in the district of Bad Durkheim. Id. at 1.
Appellant applied to plant wine-growing vines on her land. Id. at 1. The
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only against the German Constitution and constitutions of other
member states, but also against the right of property contained in
the ECHR and the public interest exception to the ECHR.- The
court concluded that the limitation did not entail any undue
limitation on the right to property.5 Finally, in Kent Kirk the ECJ
itself for the first time introduced a reference to the ECHR and
ruled that retroactive penal provisions violate Community law."
More recently, the court has looked to the case law of the ECJ
for guidance concerning the scope of fundamental rights
guaranteed by the convention." In ERTAE v. DEP & ANOR the
ECJ was asked to rule, inter alia, on the question of whether the
grant of exclusive rights to operate a television station to one
company violated a competitor's right to freedom of expression
guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights.
In his opinion, Advocate General Lenz acknowledged
that it was the ECHR that has primary responsibility to judge the
adherence of member states to the ECHR and that it was not a
function of the ECJ to examine the compatibility of the rules of
member states with the ECHR.5 However, while he acknowledged
that the ECHR could supply guidelines that should be followed
within the framework of Community law he concluded that, with
respect to Article 10, the practice of the Commission on Human
Rights and the Court of Human Rights "yields nothing additional"
to an analysis of the legitimacy of the television monopoly under
the relevant provisions of the EEC Treaty.'
The court ruled that Community Law does not prevent the
granting of a monopoly but emphasized that "the European
Convention on Human Rights has special significance" and that
"the Community cannot accept measure which are incompatible
Rheinland-Pfalz denied the authorization as unsuitable for wine-growing. Id. at 1.
54. Id. at %7-10.
55. These developments in the Community's human rights protections were
considered adequate by the German Constitutional Court that overruled its earlier
decision in holding that it will not exercise jurisdiction to rule on the applicability
and sufficiency of Community law. See Bundesverfassungsgericht, 3 C.M.L.R. 225
(1987). See also, Tara C. Stever, ProtectingHuman Rights in the European Union,
20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 919, at 967 (1997).
56. Regina v. Kent Kirk, [1084] E.C.R. 2689, [1084] 3 C.M.L.R. 522.
57. ERT AE v. DEP & ANOR (Case-C-260/89).
58. The main issues related to whether a television monopoly held by a single
company to which a member state had granted exclusive rights was permissible
under Community Law and whether the rules on the free movement of goods in
particular Art. 9, 30 and 36 of the Treaty precluded such a monopoly.
59. ERT AE v. DEP & ANOR (Case-C-260/89).

60. Id.

2001]

HUMAN RIGHTS AND EUROPEAN UNION

with adherence of human rights thus recognized and guaranteed." 1
The court ruled that, the public policy, health, and security
exceptions argued by the TV station with the monopoly must be
looked at in the light of the principles of freedom of expression
based in Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights.62
The aspect of human rights that the court has dealt with most
exhaustively is the general principle of equal treatment (or
nondiscrimination). This principle was firmly established in Article
141 (ex Article 119) of the EEC, which guarantees equal pay for
equal work based on gender 63 and the court has developed a fairly
extensive jurisprudence with respect to gender equality in the
workplace. Perhaps because of its explicit treaty foundation and
the frequent requests for preliminary rulings and subsequent
council directives the principle of equal treatment based on gender
appears to be the most frequent human rights issue addressed by
the court. 6 The court has also ruled on provisions in secondary65
legislation dealing with civil, social, and economic rights,
discrimination based on nationality, groups in the agricultural
sector, and affirmative action.66

Initially, the ECJ's emphasis on human rights was
implemented through "negative integration" in which Community
institutions were prohibited from acting in any way that could lead
to a violation of the fundamental principles of human rights much
in the same way that the court developed its protection of the
Community's four freedoms-goods, workers, service, and capital.
However, the European Court of Justice has been instrumental in
developing an evolving jurisprudence with respect to human rights
and has recognized the numerous rights that must
be respected.67 The
68
include:
rights
these
Parliament has noted that
61. Id.
62. See Benjamin L. Apt, The Right to Freedom of Expression in the European
Union, 1998 Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law, 4 COLUM. J. EuR. L.
69, 89. See also, Lentia v. Austria, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 93 (1994).
Although it recognized that freedom of expression is a fundamental right and must
be recognized, it failed to provide guidance concerning the impact of Article 10 on
Community law.
63. Treaty of Amsterdam.
64. See generally Elizabeth F. Defeis, The Treaty of Amsterdam: The Next Step
Towards Gender Equality?, 23 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1 (1999).
65. Flaherty & Lally-Green, FundamentalRights in the European Union, DuQ.
L. REv., 249, at 304-05, nn.338-340 (1998).
66. See id. at 306, nn.350-53.
67. See generally, Alston and Weiler, supra note 23.
68. European Parliament Fact Sheet 2.1.0., Respect for FundamentalRights in
the Union, (1999), available at www.europa.eu.int/abc/citlen.htm (last modified
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9

Freedom of association"
Freedom
of religion and confession71
72
Privacy
73
Medical secrecy
74
Property

Freedom of profession75
Freedom of trade76
Freedom of industryl
Freedom of competition78
Respect for family life79
Entitlement to effective legal defense and a fair trial"
Inviolability of residence"'
82
Freedom of expression and publication
However, while there has been a gradual expansion of the
ECJ's protection of fundamental rights within the European Union,
the ECJ has placed limits on the protection of these rights as well.
In InternationaleHandelsgesellschaft, for example, even though the
ECJ declared that fundamental rights might be utilized as the basis
for annulling Community laws, "such rights are not granted without
restraint but must be compatible with the Community's structure
and objectives."" They must always be "considered with regard to
the social function of the protected activity. '"" Additionally, "[the
principle of proportionality and the guarantee of essential content
are further constraints.
Consequently where the Community

Nov. 16, 2000 and visited on Apr. 4, 2001).
69. Defrenne v. Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455.
70. Gewerkschaftsbund, Massa et al. 1974 E.C.R. 917, 925.
71. Prais, 1976 E.C.R. 1589, 1599.
72. National Panasonic, 1980 E.C.R. 2033,2056 et seq.
73. Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1992 E.C.R. 2575.
74. Hauer, 1979 E.C.R. 3727,3745 et seq.
75. Id.
76. International Trade Association, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 1135 et seq.
77. Usinor, 1984 E.C.R. 4177 et seq.
78. France, 1985 E.C.R. 531.
79. Commission v. Germany, 1989 E.C.R. 1263.
80. Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1986 E.C.R.
1651 et seq.; Pecastaing v. Belgium, 1989 E.C.R. 691 et seq., 716.
81. Hoechst AG v. Commission, 1989 E.C.R. 2919.
82. VBVB, VBBB, 1984 E.C.R. 99 et seq.
83. Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft GmbH v. Einfuhr-undVorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125; 1972 C.M.L.R. 255.
84. European Parliament Fact Sheet 2.1.0., Respect for FundamentalRights in
the Union, (1999), available at www.europa.eu.int/abc/citl-en.htm (last modified
Nov. 16, 2000 and visited on Apr. 4, 2001).
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intervenes in the protected sphere of a fundamental right it may
neither violate the principle of proportionality nor affect the
'
essential content of that right."85
Although the court has taken a strong position with respect to
ensuring that Community actions adhere to human rights standards,
it is much more deferential when national legislation is in issue.
The court is reluctant to address claims of human rights violations
in national legislation that implicate Community law.
Thus, in Cinetheque, the Court declined to review French
legislation under Article 10 of the ECHR to determine whether a
French law that prohibited the sale of videotapes during their first
year of release violated one's freedom of expression.86 The Court
stated: "Although it is true that it is the duty of this Court to ensure
observance of fundamental rights in the field of Community law, it
has no power to examine the compatibility with the European
Convention of national legislation which concerns, as in this case,
an area which falls within the jurisdiction of the national
legislator. '
Similarly, in Kremzow v. Austria, 8 the ECJ was asked for a
preliminary ruling on the question of whether the Austrian court's
failure to implement a decision of the ECHR concerning a violation
of a defendant's right to defend himself in a criminal proceeding
violated his rights under Community law. The defendant argued
that the Austrian court violated his right to freedom of movement
under community law by unlawful detention.89
The court rejected Kremzow's interpretation of the freedom of
movement provision of the EC Treaty.9 Although the deprivation
of liberty prevents a person from exercising freedom of movement,
the court did not find a sufficient connection with Community law
to justify the application of Community provisions. 1 The court
said: "where national legislation is concerned with a situation
which, as in the case at issue in the main proceedings, does not fall
within the field of application of Community law, the court cannot,
in a reference for a preliminary ruling, give the interpretive
guidance necessary for the national court to determine whether that
85.

Id. See also Case 265/87 Schrader v. Hauptzollamt Gronau, 1989 E.C.R.

2237 (1989).

86. Cases 60-61/84, Cinetheque S.A. and Others v. Federation Nationale des
Cinemas Francais, 1985 E.C.R. 2605.

87. Id. at 2627.

88. Case C/29919, Kremzow v. Repubbliek Osterrich, [1997] 3 S.M.L.R. 1289.

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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national legislation is in conformity with the fundamental rights
whose observance the court ensures, such as those deriving in
particular from the Convention." ' Similarly, in SPUC v. Grogan,
the court refused to offer an opinion on whether the dissemination
of information about abortion services abroad violated the Article
10 guarantee of freedom of expression contained in the ECHR.93
Perhaps the ECJ's most notable limitation on the
incorporation of fundamental rights in the Community is its refusal
to incorporate the ECHR as a directly operative source of law. In
1996, in Re: the Accession of the Community to the European
Human Rights Convention [hereinafter EHRC], the court held that
unless the EEC is amended the Community does not have the
power to accede to the Convention. 94 The court noted that no
treaty provision conferred any general power to the Community to
enact rules regarding human rights or the power to conclude the
relevant international conventions effective on Community
institutions.95 Furthermore, the ECJ found that, in the absence of
any such treaty provision, accession by the Community to the
European Convention on Human Rights is beyond its power since,
it would result in a substantial change to the Community's system
for protection of human rights, entailing the Community's integration into an institutional system where the provisions of the
ECHR would be incorporated into the Community law. 9'
In a recent decision of the ECJ, the court cast doubt on the
legal basis for the funding that is provided for the Commission for
Human Rights and for democracy-related activities. 97 As a result of
the judgment in United Kingdom v. Commission, many projects
were frozen and the unsatisfactory legal basis for much of the
activities necessary to monitor and promote the respect for human
rights in the Community became apparent. 9

92. Dimple D. Dhabalia, The European Court of Justice: An Active Enforcer
of Freedom, or a Passive Player in the EC Game?, 27 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y.

567, at 571, (1999). See also, Cases 60-61/84, Cinetheque S.A. and Others v.
Federation Nationale des Cinemas Francais, 1985 E.C.R. 2605.
93. SPUC v. Grogan, (Case C-159/90). See infra text accompanying notes 163173.

94. Case 2/94, Re: the Accession of the Community to the European Human
Rights Convention, 2 C.M.L.R. 265 (1996).
95.
96.

See id.
See id.

97. Case C-106/96, United Kingdom v. Commission, (1998), available at
www.curia.eu.int/en/jurisp/ index.htm (last updated on May 25, 2001).
98. Alston & Weiler, supra note 23, at 663.
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C. PotentialClash Between ECJ and ECHR Jurisdiction
Until now, the European Court of Justice derived its human
rights standards primarily from the constitutions of member states
and Community law, but it also referred to the Convention on
Human Rights and other international treaties. Although it has
referred to decisions of the ECJ, it has not specifically ruled that
the decisions of the ECHR are controlling on matters of
interpretation of human rights but looks to their cases for
guidance.' The European Court of Justice and the European
Court of Human Rights have sometimes interpreted the rights
outlined in the Convention on Human Rights differently. Now that
the Amsterdam Treaty defines fundamental rights as those in the
European Convention on Human Rights and grants the European
Court of Justice the explicit task of expounding upon these rights,
there exists a possible conflict between the European Court of
Justice's interpretation and that of the European Court of Human
Rights.
In the past, the ECJ has taken several approaches when faced
with deciding human rights issues that were to come before the
ECHR or which had already been decided by that court. Some
cases involve actual conflict based upon differing interpretation of
the relevant provisions of the Convention, other cases appear
inconsistent in result, but where the court based its decision on an
analysis of a different fundamental right and those cases that
recognized that a fundamental right guaranteed by the ECHR was
involved but in which the court avoided ruling on the content of
that right.
An example of the first category is in the area of privacy rights.
At the center of the possible conflict lies the differing interpretation
of Article 8 of the Convention on Human Rights guarantee of the
right to "privacy in the home and in correspondence."
The European Court of Justice has interpreted the right to
privacy of Article 8 as not encompassing business activities. ' In
99. See ERT AE v. DEP & ANOR (Case C/260/89).
100. In Hoechst, the EC Commission adopted a series of decisions requiring
various businesses to submit to investigations into their possible participation in
agreements or concerted practices that fixed prices and quotas or sales objectives
of PVC and polyethylene in the European Community. Hoechst (Case 46/87)
refused to submit to the investigation and only permitted the investigation after a
search warrant was issued. Hoechst applied to the court for a declaration that the
series of decisions were void for infringement of the fundamental right to the
inviolability of the home. The court held, that Article 8(1) of the European
Convention on Human Rights is concerned primarily with the development of
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Hoechst, the defendant challenged the decision of the EC
Commission that required various businesses to submit to investigations into their possible participation in agreements or concerted
practices that fixed prices and quotas or sales objectives of goods in
the European Community.'' Hoechst refused to submit to the
investigation and only permitted the investigation after a search
warrant was issued.'0 Hoechst argued that the actions of the
Commission were void in that they infringed on the fundamental
right to the inviolability of the home. 3 The court held that
"[a]rticle 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights is
concerned primarily with the development of individual's personal
freedom and may not therefore be extended to business
premises."' '
Two years later, the European Court of Human Rights held
that a "search of professional activities and premises" constitutes a
violation of the right to privacy.' 5 The applicant was a lawyer
whose offices were searched by the German police pursuant to a
search warrant issued by the Munich District Court.'°
The applicant complained that the search had violated his right
to respect for his home and correspondence as guaranteed by
Article 8.'°7 The court held that: interpreting the terms 'private life'
and 'home' as encompassing certain professional or business
activities or premise is consonant with the object and purpose of
Article 8 and such an interpretation would not unduly hamper the
ability of the states to conduct a search.ln

individual's personal freedom and may not therefore be extended to business
premises. Hoechst, 4 C.M.L.R. 410 (1991).
101. Hoechst, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 410 at I. A.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. Article 8 provides in relevant part:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security,
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
105. Niemietz v. Germany, 16 E.H.R.R. 97 33 (1993).
106. Id. The warrant ordered the search in order to obtain information that
would reveal the identity and possible whereabouts of a third party who was the
subject of criminal investigation by the State.
107. Id. at 46.
10& Id. at 31.
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A similar conflict is presented in the interpretations of the right
against self-incrimination as found in Article 6. The European
Court of Justice held that Article 6 only applies to criminal
investigations, not to administrative procedures.&°9 In Orkem, the
applicant was requested to produce documents in connection with
an E.C. commission's request for information in connection with an
investigation of the applicant for infringements of competition
law." The court held that: "the right not to give evidence against
oneself only applied to a person charged with an offense in criminal
'
proceedings."111
The court further held that individuals might not
rely on this right against self-incrimination when questioned with
infringements in the economic sphere."'
Yet, in a subsequent case, the European Court of Human
Rights reached a different result."3 In Funke, after a search by
French customs officials failed to produce sufficient evidence to
lead to criminal proceedings for currency and capital transfer
offenses, the applicant was asked to produce certain specific
documents. 114 When he refused, he was prosecuted and ordered to
pay a fine and also a daily penalty until he complied.'
The
European Court of Human Rights held that a person is entitled
under Article 6 to remain silent and not incriminate himself, and
any attempt to use pecuniary sanction to force him to produce selfincriminating documents was a breach of Article 6.116
The second category, namely, where the respective courts
focus on different rights to resolve the issue before it, can be
illustrated by the treatment of homosexuals by the courts. In Grant
v. South-West Trains, the European Court of Justice held that
prohibition of discrimination based on sex, a fundamental principal
of Community Law, did not cover discrimination on the grounds of
sexual orientation. 7
In that case, an employer granted
concessionary travel tickets to members of its staff for one legal
spouse or for one "common law opposite sex spouse" subject to a
statutory declaration being made that a "meaningful relationship"
had existed for a period of two years or more. Ms. Grant applied
for travel concessions for her female partner with whom she
109.
110.

Orkem SA v. EC Commissions, E.C.R. 3283, 4 C.M.L.R. 502 (1989).
See id.

111.

Id. at 503

112.
113.

See id.
Funke v. France, 1 C.M.L.R. 897 (1993).

114. Id. at
115.
116.
117.

9.

Id. at 11.
Id. at [44.
Case 249/96, Grant v. South-West Trains, 1 C.M.L.R. 993 (1998).
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declared she had a "meaningful relationship" for over two years.
South-West Trains refused the application, stating that the nonmarried concession only applied to partners of the opposite sex.
The court held that this denial of benefits does not constitute
discrimination prohibited by Article 141 (ex Article 119) or Council
Directive 75/117.118

In so ruling, the court disregarded the opinion of the Advocate
General who suggested that the policy of SWT regarding travel
concessions for same-sex couples violated Article 141 (ex Article
119) of the EC Treaty."9 Rather, the court focused on "the present
state of the law within the Community"'2 and noted that although
the European Parliament declared that it deplores all forms of
discrimination based on an individual's sexual orientation, the
Community itself had not adopted "rules providing for such
equivalence.' 121 It also looked at decisions of the European Court
on Human Rights and the Commission on Human Rights to determine the present state of the law with the Community and deferred
to national zlegislators to address discrimination based on sexual
orientation. 2

In its more recent opinions, the European Court of Human
Rights has taken a different approach and issued two separate
opinions in which it struck down the investigation and discharge for
homosexuality of individuals in the English Armed Forces. 123 In
Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom 24 and Lustig-Prean& Beckett

v. United Kingdom, the applicants complained that the investigation
118. Council Directive 75/117 states:
The principle of equal pay for men and women outlined in Article 119 of
the Treaty, hereinafter called 'principle of equal pay,' means, for the
same work or for work to which equal value is attributed, the elimination
of all discrimination on grounds of sex with regard to all aspects and
conditions of remuneration.
119. This in itself was unusual because the Court follows the opinion of the
Advocate General in more than 75% of the cases. See Heather Hunt, Diversity
and the European Union: Grant v. SWT, The Treaty of Amsterdam and the Free
Movement of Persons,27 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 633, at 642 (1999).

120.

Grant, supra note 117.

121.

Id.

122. See, e.g., X, Y, and Z v. United Kingdom, (1997) 4 E.H.R.R. 143.
123. Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom, 33985/96 & 33986/96 Sept. 27, 1999.
124. In Smith, an unidentified woman informed the Royal Air Force authorities
that the appellant Ms. Smith was a homosexual, Smith admitted, without
interrogation, that she was a homosexual and she was discharged. The second
applicant, Mr. Graeme Grady, joined the Royal Air Force on August 12, 1980 as
an aircraftman. Following the disclosure that Grady was a homosexual,
investigators searched applicant's electronic diary and home for information
revealing homosexual conduct. After applicant admitted to being a homosexual,
he was administratively discharged.
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into their homosexuality and their discharge from the military on
the sole ground that they are homosexual constituted violations of
Article 8 of the Convention, right to respect for private and family
life, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14, nondiscrimination rights.
In Smith, the European Court of Human Rights held that the
investigations by the military police into the applicants' homosexuality, which included detailed interviews with each of them and
with third parties on matters relating to their sexual orientation and
practices as well as the administrative discharge constituted a direct
interference with the applicants' right to respect for their private
lives.
The court stated: "the Government has not offered
convincing and weighty reasons to justify the policy against
homosexuals in the armed forces."' ' Also, "neither the investigations conducted into the applicants' sexual orientation, nor their
discharge on the grounds of their homosexuality in pursuance of the
Ministry of Defense policy, were justified under Article 8, § 2 of the
Convention. 26 The court held that such investigation and discharge
constitutes a violation of the right to privacy as contained in Article
8 of the Convention on Human Rights.
Lustig-Prean also involved a challenge to the policy of
excluding homosexuals from the military. The court found that the
investigations were conducted solely because of the sexual
orientation of the applicants and that "the interrogation process
was particularly intrusive." 12
Although the issue of a violation of the non-discrimination
guarantee was raised in both cases, the court grounded its decision
on a violation of privacy rights. Thus, although not directly
conflicting with the ECJ decision in South-West, it clearly exempli2
fies a different sensitivity to issues of homosexual discrimination. 1
These decisions were followed by a decision by the European
Court of Human Rights that held that it was a violation of both
Article 8 (respect for private and family life) and Article 14
(prohibition against discrimination) of the Convention to take away
parental responsibility from the father of a child due to the fact he

125. See id. at 40.
126. See id. at 42. Also, Lustig-Prean & Beckett v. United Kingdom, 31417/96
& 32377/96, Sept. 27, 1999.
127. Lustig-Prean & Beckett v. United Kingdom, 31417/96 & 32377/96, at 83
& 84, Sept. 27,1999..
128. Their reasoning has been criticized because it evaded ruling on the issue of
discrimination. See, Recent Cases, 113 HARv.L. REv. 1563 (2000).
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was homosexual.'29 In Salgueiro v. Portugal, the Lisbon Court of
Appeal denied parental responsibility to the father of a child,
despite an agreement to the contrary reached at the time of the
divorce.'9 The court based its decision on two factors, namely the
best interest of the child and the fact that the applicant was a
homosexual living with another man. The Lisbon Court of Appeal
reasoned, "the child must live in a traditional Portuguese family"' 3'
and that "homosexuality is an abnormality and children must not
grow up in the shadow of abnormal situations."'32 The European
Court of Human Rights overturned this verdict, holding that there
had been a violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private and
family life) taken together with Article 14 (prohibition against
discrimination).'33
The Amsterdam Treaty addresses the issue of sexual
orientation and allows the Council to take action to combat
discrimination based on sexual orientation. However, such action
would require unanimous consent of the Council. 3
Treatment of transsexuals is another area in which the rulings
of these two courts present potential for conflict. The European
Court of Justice has decided only one case involving transsexuals
and has ruled that the equal treatment directive that prohibits
discrimination based on sex includes transsexuals.'35 In P v. S and
Cornwall County Council, a transsexual was dismissed from her job
after informing her employer of her intention to undergo a male to
female gender reassignment operation.'36 She challenged the
dismissal as a violation of the Equal Treatment directive of 1976.' 37
In a carefully reasoned opinion, Advocate General Tessauro urged
the court to "take a courageous decision," one in accord with

129. Salgueiro v. Portugal, App. Nos. 33290/96 (1999).
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. Salgueiro v. Portugal, App. Nos. 33290/96 (1999).
134. The Amsterdam Treaty provides that: "The Council, acting unanimously
on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament,
may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethic
origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation."
Treaty of
Amsterdam Art. 13 (ex Art. 6a).
135. Case 13/94, P v. S and Cornwall County Council, 2 C.M.L.R. 247 (1996).
136. Id.
137. The Equal Treatment Directive provides in relevant part: "Application of
the principle of equal treatment with regard to working conditions, including the
conditions governing dismissal, means that men and women shall be guaranteed
the same conditions without discrimination on grounds of sex." Council Directive
76/207/EEC.
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"social justice," and to rule that such discrimination violated
Community law.'38 He also discussed the case law of the ECHR. 3 9
The court held that the dismissal violated the directive, which
required that "there should be no discrimination whatsoever on
grounds of sex.""' In so ruling, the court stated that the directive is
the expression of "one of the fundamental principles of Community
law.' ' 1 41 Moreover, "the right not to be discriminated against is one
of the fundamental human rights where observance the court has a
duty to ensure." 42 The court quoted from the European Court of
Human Rights' description of transsexuals that concluded,
"Transsexuals who have been operated on thus form a fairly welldefined and identifiable group" and held that the directive
prohibiting discrimination based on "sex" also encompasses
discrimination arising out of gender reassignment.143 The court held
that, "where unfavorable treatment of a transsexual is related to (or
rather is caused by) a change of sex, there is discrimination by
reason of sex or on grounds of sex."144 "To tolerate such
discrimination would be tantamount, as regards such a person, to a
failure to respect the dignity and freedom to which he or she is
entitled and which the court has a duty to safeguard."' 45
The European Court of Human Rights on the other hand, has
issued several opinions relating to the legal recognition of a
transsexual's new gender and has not taken the broad approach
suggested by the ECJ. Rather, it has allowed states a wide margin
of appreciation with respect to recognizing rights of transsexuals.
The court has permitted this wide margin of appreciation, because
in its view, there exists "little common ground between the
contracting states" and states thus enjoy "a wide margin of
appreciation" in their response to the request for legal rights of
transsexuals.' 4 Thus, in Cossey v. United Kingdom,47 the United
13& Id.
139. Case 13/94, P v. S and Cornwall County Council, 2 C.M.L.R. 247 (1996).
140. Id. at 1 2.
141. Id. at 911&
142. Id. at 1 22.
143. Case 13/94, P v. S and Cornwall County Council, 2 C.M.L.R. 247, at 1 16
(1996).
144. Id. at 19.
145. Id. at 1 22.
146. The doctrine of margin of appreciation, or deference to national
legislators, is rooted in national case law concerning judicial review of legislative
action. See P. VAN DUK & G. J. H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 585-89. The margin of appreciation
doctrine is premised on two assumptions. First, even in democratic societies, what
is necessary to further the state interest may vary from state to state; second, the
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Kingdom refused to issue a birth certificate to a person born male
indicating that she was female, nor to permit her to marry a man."'
Over a vigorous dissent, the ECHR held that there had been no
violation of either Article 8 or Article 12 of the Convention.

49

The

court noted that "although some contracting States would now
regard as valid a marriage between a person in Ms. Cossey's
situation and a man," there was no general abandonment of the
traditional concept of marriage. 5° Thus, the United Kingdom was
within its margin of appreciation in rejecting the request. 5 '
Nevertheless, the ECHR indicated that it had become "conscious of
the seriousness of the problems facing transsexuals and the distress
they suffer."'52 Since the Convention always has to be interpreted
and applied in light of current circumstances, it is important that the
need for appropriate legal measures in this area should be kept
under review." 53
'
Seven years later in Sheffield and Horsham v. United Kingdom,

the United Kingdom refused to give to male-to-female post-

states' own view of what is necessary is entitled to some deference by an
international court.
In Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976), the court
discussed the margin of appreciation doctrine as follows:
It is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various Contracting
States a uniform European conception of morals. The view taken by
their respective laws of the requirements of morals varies from time to
time and from place to place, especially in our era which is characterized
by a rapid and far-reaching evolution of opinion on the subject. By
reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their
countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position than the
international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these
requirements as well as on the necessity of a restriction or penalty
intended to meet them. Nevertheless, it is for the national authorities to
make initial assessment of the reality of the pressing social need implied
by the notion of "necessity" in this context.
Consequently, Article 10(2) leaves to the Contracting States a margin
of appreciation. This margin is given both to the domestic legislator
("prescribed by law") and to the bodies, judicial amongst others, that are
called upon to interpret and apply the laws in force.
Id. at 753-55.
147. Cossey v. United Kingdom, (A/184): (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 622 (1991). The
court had earlier dealt with this issue in Rees v. U.K., 9 E.H.R.R. 203 (1986), it
decided that it would reexamine the point to ascertain whether a departure from
the previous decision was warranted.
14& Id.
149. Id.
150. Cossey, 13 E.H.R.R. 622 (1991).
151. Id.
152- Id.
153. Cossey, 13 E.H.R.R. 622 (1991).
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operation transsexuals legal recognition of their status as women. 154
The court examined legislation trends in Member States and found

that a common European approach to problems created by the
recognition in law of post-operation gender status did not exist and
thus refused to depart from the Cossey opinion.'
In so doing, it
noted the decision of
the ECJ in P v. S and Cornwall County, but
56
refused to follow it.

In fact, the ECHR has been inconsistent with respect to
respecting the rights of transsexuals. The court has required that an
annotation be added to a birth certificate to reflect the male to

female gender change and distinguished its cases on this issue,' 57 but
has held that the state need not allow transsexuals to change their

birth certificates.'
It also did not require a state, the U.K., to
register a female-to-male transsexual as the father of a child
developed through AID born to a female with whom a long-term
stable relationship existed.'59 The applicants asserted that such a

refusal violated their privacy rights under Article 8 of the
Convention on Human Rights.lW The European Court of Human
Rights held that Article 8 did not require states to formally
recognize a transsexual as the biological father of a child to which

that individual did not father. 6' In this ruling, the court expressed
concern for the state's interest in control over traditional marriages
as well as disruption of the state's method of registering births and

marriages.' 62
In the third category of potential conflicts, the ECJ has

avoided ruling on a fundamental rights question that arose in a
sensitive context and in which the sensibilities of a member state
154. See Sheffield & Horsham, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at Judgment paras. 40-61, 7177.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. B v. France, 16 E.H.R.R. 1, 2 (1993).
158. Rees v. United Kingdom, (A/184) (1991) 13 ECHR 622. For further
discussion of these cases: Larry CatO Backer, Harmonization, Subsidiarity, and
Cultural Difference, an Essay on the Dynamics of Opposition Within Federation
and InternationalLegal Systems, 4 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 185 (1997); Philip
Britton, The Rainbow Flag, the European and English Law: New Development on
Sexuality and Equality,8 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 261 (1998).
159. X, Y, and Z v. United Kingdom, (1997) 4 E.H.R.R. 143. In X, Y, and Z,
the court examined whether a transsexual could be registered as the father of a
child developed through AID. X, a female-to-male transsexual, lived in a
permanent relationship with Y since 1979. In 1992, after AID treatment, Y gave
birth to Z. Id.
160. Id. at 29.
161. Id. at 52.
162. Id. at 47.
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was involved. This category is best illustrated by SPUC v.
GROGAN in which a violation of freedom of expression was
alleged in addition to violation of Community law.
In Grogan, an injunction was sought by the Society for the
Protection of Unborn Children against the activities of various
students' organizations who provided information on abortion
clinics in the UK without charging a fee.163 The question referred to

the ECJ was whether abortion clinics constitute services within the
meaning of Article 60 of the EEC Treaty and, if so, whether the
Treaty provisions on the freedom to supply services precluded a
national law that prohibited the provision of information
concerning abortion services legally carried on in another Member
state. It was also alleged that the ban on the provision of such
information violated Article 10 of the ECHR.
Advocate General Van Gervan offered the opinion that the
service provided by abortion clinics is a trans-border service that
falls within the scope of Article 60 of the EEC Treaty, prohibiting
any restriction on the provision of services. He also opined that,
consistent with Article 10 of the ECHR, a state could prohibit the
dissemination of information about such services.' 64 In so doing, he
balanced the right to life as defined by the Member State against
the freedom of expression and because no uniform moral consensus
concerning the protection of the unborn existed between member
states the member states must be allowed a fairly considerable
margin of appreciation."
In balancing the fundamental rights
163. SPUC v. Grogan, (Case C-159/90).
164. See id. Article 10 of the ECHR provides:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information
an ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary. Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether
general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out
of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the
Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's
tasks.
165. See id.
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involved, the Advocate General found that the prohibition on the
dissemination of information could be justified as "necessary in a
democratic society" as required by Article 10(2).66
However, the European Court of Justice was faced with a
dilemma. A similar case, Open Door Counseling and Dublin Well
Woman v. Ireland,would soon be decided by the ECHR in which
the Article 10 question was squarely presented. If the decision
rendered by the ECJ was inconsistent with the subsequent ruling of
the ECHR, the doctrine of supremacy of Community law would be
cast into doubt. Moreover, a ruling that the injunction violated
Article 10 of the Convention would further exacerbate relations
with Ireland.
The ECJ thus took a different approach from that advocated
by the Advocate General. The court held consistent with its prior
opinions, that medical termination of pregnancy performed in
accordance with the law of the state in which it is carried out
constitutes a service within the meaning of Article 60 of the EEC
Treaty. 67 However, the court found that the link between the
activities of the students and the medical services performed in
another state was "too tenuous" to be regarded as a restriction
within the meaning of Article 59 of the Treaty pertaining to
restrictions on the prohibition of services. 168 The court based its
holding on the fact that the students were not acting on behalf of
the out of state medical providers or as the court termed it "on
169
behalf of an economic operator established in a member state.'
Because the challenged rule fell outside the scope of Community
law, the court reasoned that it was not appropriate for the court to
assess the compatibility of the national rule with fundamental
rights, in particular, those specified in the European Convention on
Human Rights. Thus, the court declined to rule on the issue of
whether the prohibition on the dissemination of information on
medical services in another country violated Article 10 of the
ECHR. The ruling was widely criticized both by legal scholars and
commentators. 7 °
166.
167.
16&
169.
170.

See id.
Luisi and Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro, joined cases 121/85 (1986).
See generally, Grogan, supra note 163.
See generally, Grogan, supra note 163.
Siofra O'Learry, The Court of Justice as a ConstitutionalAdjudicator: an
Examination of the Abortion Information Core, 17 EUR. L. REV. 138 (1992);
Cathleen M. Colvin, Comment, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children
(Ireland)LTD. v. Grogan:Irish Abortion Law and the Free Movement of Services
in the European Community, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 476 (1991-1992); Deidra
Curtin, SPUC v. Grogan, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 585-603 (1992).
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Just one year later, the European Court of Human Rights was
squarely presented with the precise issue presented in the Grogan
Case, namely whether an injunction prohibiting the furnishing
information by a non-profit organization concerning the availability
of out of state abortion services violated Article 10 of the ECHR,
and the court in Strasbourg ruled that it did. In Open Door
Counseling and Dublin Well Women, the court held that an
injunction imposed by the Irish court restricting clinical staff from
imparting information to pregnant women concerning abortion
facilities outside Ireland by way of non-directive counseling
constituted a restraint on freedom to impart information and
violated Article 10 of the ECHR."7 ' The court considered whether
the injunction was necessary in a democratic society as permitted by
Article 10(2) of the Convention and acknowledged that the aim of
the national rule was legitimate, that is, the protection of morals as
reflected in Irish law. At the outset, it noted that freedom of
expression also applies to ideas or information that might offend or
shock the government of a segment or any population.'
Without
this pluralism, tolerance 1and
broad-mindedness
there
would
not
7
1
society.
democratic
a
exist
The court emphasized that the absolute nature of the
injunction, which imposed perpetual restraint regardless of age,
health, or reason for seeking canceling or terminating pregnancy,
was disproportionate. Thus, the court invalidated the injunction in
a situation similar to the one avoided by the ECJ earlier. The
strong dissenting opinion in the case underscores the controversial
nature of the issue that both courts were faced with deciding.
One might speculate as to how the ECJ would rule if faced
with the issue again, albeit in a slightly different factual setting.
Clearly, to follow the ruling of the ECHR would exacerbate the
already tenuous relation with a member state. The larger question
remains however, would it consider itself bound to follow the
decision of the ECHR.

171. Although the applicants also alleged a violation of privacy rights
guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention; the Court found it unnecessary to
decide this issue. Further, the injunction itself was ineffective because it did not
prevent large numbers of women from continuing to obtain abortions abroad.
172. The court cited Handyside v. United Kingdom I-E.H.R.R. 737 para. 49.
For a discussion of the case, see Angela Thompson, International Protection of
Women's Rights: An Analysis of Open Door Counseling L&B and Dublins Well
Women Centers v. Ireland, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 371 (1994).
173. See generally, Grogan, supra note 163.
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D. Expanded Jurisdictionof the ECJ and Human Rights.
Without question, the European Union will play an
increasingly important role in the area of human rights, both in its
external and internal policies. 74 The Treaty of Amsterdam has
expanded the jurisdiction of ECJ to include matters relating to
immigration, asylum, visas, border-crossings, and police and judicial
cooperation. Further, the concept of discrimination has been
expanded to include not only discrimination based on sex, but also
to discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief,
disability, age or sexual orientation. The ECHR has already
developed an extensive jurisprudence in areas such as rights of the
accused, freedom of expression, privacy rights and nondiscrimination rights, areas that the ECJ will undoubtedly be called
upon increasingly to rule upon in the future.
The Amsterdam Treaty provides no direction concerning the
proper way to reconcile conflicting decisions that might arise from
the overlapping jurisdiction nor does it provide any direction
concerning the precedential effect of ECHR decisions with respect
to provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Several proposals have been put forth with respect both to
strengthening human rights protections within the European Union
and with developing a more comprehensive and integrated system
for the protection of human rights."
Early on it was argued that the EU should join the ECHR as a
member in its own right. However, the decision of the ECJ in Re:
Accession of the Community to the European Human Rights
Convention makes clear that absent treaty modification, the EU
could not accede to the ECHR because it would result in a
fundamental change in the community system. While the opinion
itself was widely criticized there appears to be little momentum
with respect acceding to the Convention at the present time.
It has also been suggested the Union itself enact a catalogue of
rights that would be uniform throughout the Union. Indeed, in
June 1999 the European Council requested that a Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union be drawn up and
presented. It specified that the Charter should contain the
fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the ECHR as well
as those derived from the Constitutional traditions common to
174. Peter Leuprecht, Innovations in the European System of Human Rights
Protection:Is Enlargement Compatible With Reinforcement? 8 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 313 (1998).
175. Alston & Weiler, supra note 23, generally.
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member states as general principles of community law. It also
requested that the Charter take account of economic and social
rights as contained in the European Social Charter and the
Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. 7'
The Charter was to be printed in December 2000 and the
Parliament acknowledged that it was in accord with the drafting of
such a document. To date, however, the Charter has not been
accepted. At the same time, the Parliament continues to advance
the position that the Union become a party to the ECHR. While
the drafting of such a Charter, which will have legal force, is itself
now underway, its adoption and integration into the treaties must
still be accomplished. 77 One commentator has called the adoption
of a Charter of Fundamental Freedoms the worst possible scenario,
since it would establish a dual system of human rights protection in
Europe and a splitting up of rights which would undermine
the
178
authority of the Convention and the Convention system.
Another option proposed is to incorporate all substantive
provisions of the European Convention as a separate title to the
EEC Treaty, as an amendment to the Charter and to include the
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms as an
objective of the Community and the Union. The jurisdiction of the
ECJ would be enlarged to encompass human rights issues not only
as they pertain to community action, but also to actions of member
states. All member states of the EU would then withdraw from the
Convention leaving the ECJ as ultimate guarantors of human rights
in the European Union. This approach would drastically alter the
nature of the EU and appears to have gained little support. 79
Others have suggested that when an issue pertains to human
rights, the matter should be referred to the ECHR for a preliminary
ruling by the ECHR that would be binding on the ECJ. For the
same reasons advanced in the accession case, it seems unlikely that
the ECJ would allow the ECJ to be subjected to the decisions of
another international institution'1 °
176. See European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961; see also, The Community
Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, available in LEXIS, Europe
Library, EURSCP File.
177. European Council decision on the drawing up of a Charter for
fundamental rights of the European Union, available at http://europa.eu.int
/ABC/doc/off/bull/en/9906/.1064 (last updated on Sep. 7, 1999).
178. Akos G. Toth, The European Union and Human Rights: The Way
Forward,34 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 491-92 (1997).
179. Id.
180. Opinion 2/94 (1996) 2 C.M.L.R. at 279-80, at SV, Para. 3 (submission of
the Portuguese Government).
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Former Advocate General Frances G. Jacobs has suggested
that the court has been most effective in advancing human rights
throughout the Community and foresees little change in the
future. 8' However the present system has been severely criticized
and warrants reform at this time.
V.

Conclusion

While the momentum for a Charter of Fundamental Freedoms
progresses, the jurisdictional conflict remains unresolved. Clearly,
what is needed is a more holistic approach to the protection of
fundamental rights in the European Union. However, the ECJ in
the past has shown leadership in the area of protecting human
rights, even without specific textual authorization in the ECC
Charter. It has taken positions on human rights that are in some
instances broader than the position taken by the ECHR. In
addition, increasingly, both courts look to decisions and
jurisprudence of the other for guidance. While neither will consider
itself bound by the other court's decision, there is clearly deference
and one can expect closer cooperation between the two courts as
the jurisdiction of the ECJ expands with respect to human rights. It
is a basic principle of European Union Law that a community
national who travels to a member state and exercises Treaty rights,
such as to work, enjoys the right to be treated to the same living
and working conditions as nationals of the host state. Community
nationals should also be entitled to assume that throughout the
European Union, they will enjoy fundamental human rights, in
particular those set forth in the ECHR, that are interpreted and
administered uniformly throughout the Union. In other words, as
Advocate General Jacobs has said, the new European citizen
should be able to say 'civic Europeus sum' and to invoke that status
in order to oppose any violation of his fundamental rights.""l , As
the jurisprudence of both the ECJ and the ECHR continue to
develop, this should be the case.

181. Francis G. Jacobs, Symposium: The European Union and the US:
ConstitutionalSystems in Evolution, Judicial Doctrinesfor the Protectionof Basic
Human Rights, Fordham University School of Law Center on European Union
Law and International Antitrust. (February 1998)
182. Id.

